Trip report – Council on Ionizing Radiation Measurements & Standards (CIRMS) meeting Gaithersburg, MD, October 27-29, 2003 by Bob Lommler.
Summary:
The meeting was on international (ISO) and national (ANSI) standards, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) test and performance (T&PE) standards, and calibrations and tests for instruments fielded for Homeland Security applications. The completion of these documents will allow federal grants for state and local purchasing of instruments and services meeting these criteria. ISO and ANSI standards are public documents. DHS T&PE standards are classified because they give the current threat and are not releasable to state or local government or to the equipment manufacturers who are trying to make the equipment. Lack of fully releasable specifications adversely impacts instrument development, thus DHS hired four Department of Energy (DOE) labs to independently test instruments to give them a “Consumer Report” rating system that can be released to potential purchasers in state and local government. Labs calibrating or maintaining these instruments probably will be required to purchase DHS approved calibration standards that are artifacts in prescribed tests for each instrument. Where such standards are not available or practical, the labs will have to use reverse engineering to determine what tests are needed to maintain each piece of equipment.
Instrument testing is scheduled to begin in January 2004. There are four proposed instrument standards. Only three are complete: portable radiation detection pagers, portable detection instruments, and radionuclide identifiers. DHS estimates that only two pagers currently on the market can pass the portable radiation detection pager ANSI standard. DHS knows that no portable detection instruments can currently pass the ANSI portable detection instrument standard. Three radionuclide identifiers may meet the ANSI radionuclide identifier standard. IEMA owns two of the radionuclide identifiers that may meet the ANSI standard.
The meeting concluded that laboratories calibrating or testing instruments intended for Homeland Security require significant modification in their beta, gamma, and x-ray capabilities and may need special nuclear material and additional radionuclides in the lab that may be hard to obtain.
DHS funding for state and local government purchases is included in the budget year beginning October 2004. The CIRMS meeting is used by DHS to help determine priorities, programs and funds required.
Details of the
meeting:
Bob Lommler attended the Homeland Security breakout sessions at the meeting and also met on 10/29 with Frank Cerra, Lab Manager of the FDA x-ray calibration laboratory, to determine new developments impacting the x-ray calibration portion of the IEMA calibration laboratory. The presentations and their impact on the IEMA calibration laboratory are discussed below.
The ANSI standards N42-32 through 35 address detection and identification, not measurement. All the standards assume the users of the instrument are not technical persons; they are police, fire, rescue, and customs personnel first. Training is expected to be one day to a week initially with a day refresher training each year. Simple and reliable equipment with a minimum of false readings is the goal. Detection is limited to photon radiation. The ability to identify everything is not needed. Only a limited library of radionuclides is of interest. The biggest problem with all systems is detection or identification while natural radiation fields are present. Standards N42-32, 33 and 34 should be finalized on December 19 and published as official standards during January 2004. The N42-35 portal standard will be completed and published about 60 days afterwards.
The status of instruments expect to meet the standards is as follows:
N42-32: Two radiation pagers currently produced appear to have a chance of meeting the Type 1 standard. These pagers were not identified. Joe McDonald is in charge of this standard.
N42-33: No portable detection equipment is currently manufactured anywhere in the world that will meet the Type 1 or 2 standard. Some come close, but need improvements in battery operating time, ease of use, and use in certain wet and cold environments. Morgon Cox is in charge of this standard.
N42-34: Three portable identification instruments may meet this standard. IEMA has two of these models, the SAM 935 and the Exploranium GR-135. Peter Charo is in charge of this standard.
N42-35: No portals meet this standard. USDOE labs are fabricating three prototype portals to meet this standard. Brian Rees is in charge of this standard
The next step after these standards are published is to create DHS T&PE standards. The people in charge of each ANSI standard also write the DHS T&PE standard for tests that instruments must pass beyond the ANSI standard tests. These standards are classified and will not be released by DHS. DHS expects all T&PE standards to be completed about 60 days after the corresponding ANSI standard is published.
The next ANSI standard beginning development is the ANSI N13 series training standard for personnel operating this equipment. The person in charge of this effort is Sandy Pearle. No schedule exists for this standard yet.
The first equipment tested to DHS T&PE standards will probably occur in April. A “Consumer Report” list of instruments that DHS funds can be used to purchase is planned to be available when funds for purchases become available in October 2004. Issues that have to be completed before the list of instruments is made available include defining extreme operating conditions and developing standards for manuals and training provided to equipment users.
Future (more than 2 years away) actions include standards for cleanup activities such as measuring airborne activity, mobile systems (truck systems), and real-time accessible data networking of all measurement and detection instruments into systems.
NIST is coordinating testing of the protocols by four DOE laboratories. No single laboratory in the US has the capability to perform all tests. Instruments must be rotated between the laboratories until all tests are completed. Once the testes are completed each lab completes the documentation on one protocol evaluation and provides the evaluation to NIST, who reviews it and forwards it to DHS with their recommendations for change. The DOE labs involved and the report each is responsible are listed below.
PNNL – Handheld detectors and radiation detectors
ORNL – Radionuclide identifiers
LANL – Portal monitors
LLNL – Responsible for testing instruments capabilities against real nuclear weapons
The testing of the draft ANSI standards and T&PE protocols began in November. Testing equipment against the ANSI standards and T&PE protocols should be completed by the end of first quarter, 2004.
Because of the classified nature of the T&PE protocols and the desire to test versus real nuclear weapons, only DOE labs will be allowed to do the testing. Sharing information with manufacturers and state and local agencies purchasing the equipment is a major unresolved problem since the test results are classified and can’t be released to the public. Other major issues not resolved include who pays for instrument testing and what liability issues are involved by restricting access to test information.
The tests result in an overall rating of a blue or gold star if the instrument passes all DHS T&PE protocols. Additional features which all users don’t need, such as usability in extreme environments probably will be indicated by a “Consumer Reports” system of circles. Users receiving DHS funding will be required to buy equipment from an approved DHS list.
DHS T&PE protocols include additional tests not included in the ANSI standards, information on when retesting of instruments by the four DOE laboratories is required, forms to record test data, and detailed test procedures including the order tests are performed. Field tests (user suitability tests) are not part of the DHS T&PE protocols.
The next steps after completing the DHS T&PE protocols include listing available technology in a consumer report format for purchasing agent use, creating standards for user training, providing information on existing standards to users prior to formal training guidance, creating a DHS certification process for equipment and training, and accrediting laboratories for periodically testing DHS equipment. There probably will be daily user requirements and annual calibration and test requirements for each instrument model on the approved DHS list.
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Analytical Response by Erik Nielsen, Remote Sensing Laboratory
This presentation would be considered a bit off topic if it weren’t for whom DOE and DHS expect to get lab assistance to a DHS emergency. Since most mobile laboratory support is owned by states, the first place DOE and DHS will go to get additional help will be adjoining states with mobile lab capabilities. This means some standardization is required between DOE, DHS and states for radiochemistry laboratories.
The presentation covered the structure of various emergency responses and mentioned the main issue, which is standardization. Work is proceeding on a proposal, but no timetable was offered at the meeting.
Roadway Monitoring for Radiation Sources at the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey by Bill Casson, LANL
The monitoring system is used to detect potential radiological threats before they can enter the tunnels that the authority operates in New York City. To do so requires monitors at locations several miles before toll plazas so that the vehicles can be identified early to provide enough notice so that police can search the vehicles with the least impact on traffic. During rush hour traffic travels slowly so that detection, vehicle identification and control before reaching the tunnel is fairly straightforward. Detecting threats at 40 mph and responding in time is a big challenge during night hours.
Proprietary instrument data output is the biggest obstacle to setting up a working system. DHS will need to establish a single data communication standard for all instruments it purchases, from portal detectors down to and including radiation pagers on police officers.
IAEA Support - Standardization of Border Monitoring Equipment by Rolf Arlt, IAEA Nuclear Equipment Support Laboratory
IAEA provides support by providing equipment classes to countries setting up monitoring programs, providing standardized system recommendations through issue of IAEA specification documents, and providing a nuclear equipment support laboratory to test new and existing systems. The IAEA nuclear equipment support laboratory does the same equipment tests the four DOE laboratories will do for DHS. The laboratory also does the training and certification that DHS will perform once their equipment testing system is in place.
The IAEA laboratory had major input into the ANSI standards and the DHS T&PE protocols. Their equivalent of DHS T&PE protocol is a tech document. The IAEA system is slightly different. Both systems involve selection of test labs that can know the threat and a certification process for equipment used for border monitoring. Equipment manufacturers are allowed to issue certificates that their equipment meets all standards based upon an IAEA laboratory certificate.
Results of their testing based on their current standard are as follows:
13 of 24 pocket and handheld instruments passed testing, only 2 radiation pagers passed
No radionuclide identifiers have passed testing
The biggest single need for instruments is for a handheld neutron search detector
Problems identified are as follows:
“Hit” rate is not good enough
Sensitivity for NARM adversely affects too many radionuclide identifications
Equipment sensitive to neutrons needs a timer/counter for operator to use properly
Handheld radionuclide identifiers probably require 2 different spectral detectors to meet standard
Usability still is a major problem
ACRa response to Homeland Security Issues by Lynne Fairobent, American College of Radiology Association (ACRa)
Per NCRP Report 138, the probability of occurance is highest for radiological dispersal devices, followed by a conventional explosion at a nuclear facility, and finally a tactical nuclear device. The ACRa response to its members is an education program to hospital personnel in the form of a quick reference primer and a disaster preparedness web page on the ACRa web site, which is open to the public.
Impact of New Technology on Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security workers, a new exposure study by John Cardarelli, NIOSH
Prior to 9/11/01 airport security scanners were either employees or contractors employed by airlines. A 1991 FAA regulation required the security screeners to be monitored for radiation exposure under most conditions but FAA employees inspecting such operations were not monitored because the low output of the machines didn’t create a large enough exposure potential. Went the security function was given to TSA all the FAA regulations on the screeners were transferred to TSA. Since FAA employees were not monitored, all TSA employees are not monitored. New equipment, using CT scans, has increased the potential for exposures. TSA employees filed complaints with NIOSH, who is responsible for federal employee safety, asking why when privately employed they had dosimetry, but now don’t require it as government employees even though the new equipment is much more powerful.
NIOSH created a study to determine dosimetry requirements for the new security equipment. The study is specific to equipment and worker locations introduced since TSA assumed responsibility for airport security. Two categories of airports are included in the study and O’Hare Airport is one of the study locations. The study starts November 2003 and ends November 2004. The report is due by January 2005. A handout on the study was provided to all meeting participants and is available from Bob Lommler.
CIRMS assists NIST, CDRH and DHS obtaining program and funding support from Congress by issuing Measurement Program Descriptions (MPDs) that fully explain the needs of the Agencies and state and local government and provide the necessary justification to obtain legislation and funds. Each MPD has four components: the objective, background, actions items as a means for meeting the objective, and resource requirements. This is the first year that DHS has asked for MPDs. The MPDs will be given to DHS in final form in January 2004 for use in the budget year beginning October 2004. A rough description of the areas covered by the MPDs proposed is as follows:
Developing guidelines for safe use of radiography systems for Homeland Security. As currently used the systems have high potential for injuring operators of the systems and people illegally using shipping containers to enter the US.
Implementing a standard communication protocol for instruments. Potential cost savings for DHS and government agencies for the next five years is significant.
Guidelines for the use, calibration and maintenance of instruments in the field and requirements for return to facilities for testing and calibration. This includes funding for unique calibration equipment required by calibration laboratories and funding to equipment users to pay for the calibrations and maintenance.
Guidelines for use by state and local government for choosing instrument to meet specific environment needs. The guidelines give a checklist to match needs with specific instrument features so that non-technical personnel can correctly choose instruments for purchase.
Standards for field measurements, QA, data storage and transmission, primary for radiochemistry laboratories. If DHS has to depend on states and commercial facilities such as nuclear power stations for laboratory assistance, it needs a method to receive all the field data, QA data, and associated information in a fixed format that it can readily exchange with other laboratories and data analysts.